Donald
Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a
turning point in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
However, the issue is much bigger than Palestine as Donald Trump may
have just lit the match that will set off the powder keg of the Arab
World.
by
Eric Draitser
Part
4 - Beijing, Moscow, and competing interests in Palestine
China
and Russia have, each in its own way, begun asserting themselves in
the Middle East. Naturally, Russia’s military intervention in the
war in Syria has made Moscow a belligerent in the region, with all
the baggage that comes with that role. In contrast, Beijing has begun
asserting itself economically, which is fairly typical of the Chinese
strategy for power projection. These differing approaches, each
capitalizing on the strengths of the respective countries, further
complicate the picture in Palestine.
In
response to the move by Trump, China’s foreign ministry spokesman
reaffirmed that China “support[s] the just cause of the
Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights and
stand behind Palestine in building an independent, full-sovereignty
state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
This was, of course, a reiteration of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
address to the Arab League in 2016, in which he proclaimed that
Beijing supports East Jerusalem as the capital of a sovereign
Palestinian state.
Rhetoric
aside, it should be remembered that Palestinian President Abbas’
visit to China over the summer resulted in Xi making a new four-point
proposal for Palestine, which not only reiterated China’s stance on
East Jerusalem, but also offered financial support in the form of
Chinese companies investing in Palestine to develop industrial parks
and solar power plants.
China
sees in the Middle East a linchpin of its Belt and Road Initiatives,
which attempt to develop land-based access for Chinese goods to
Europe and elsewhere in the global economy. China has offered $15
billion in investment for large-scale projects in the Middle East,
but does China have the political stomach for wading into the
minefield of Middle East politics?
Would
China also jeopardize its chances to build the Red-Med railway in
Israel — the plan to connect the Red Sea Israeli port of Eilat with
the Mediterranean port of Ashdod — which could be seen as arguably
the most geopolitically important project China has in the entire
Middle East?
This
rail project would effectively offer China an alternative to the Suez
Canal, which today is one of the most important commercial shipping
chokepoints in the world, and one on which China relies heavily. For
China, the big prize at the center of all its Belt and Road
initiatives is unfettered, mostly land-based access to the European
market. The Red-Med railway provides that. Would Beijing risk it in
order to take a stand for Palestine? This remains to be seen.
And then
there’s Russia. While the Kremlin’s gamble on intervention in
Syria has paid off in terms of winning the war for Assad’s
government and securing Russia’s place as patron and protector of
Syria, it has also made Russia hated in much of the Middle East,
especially among Sunni power brokers, from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Qatar to Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine itself. The Russians have put
themselves in a strategically complex scenario wherein they have more
influence with one side (Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and the Shia
alliance) while also losing, or at least significantly weakening,
their ability to play all sides.
Add to
that the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have a warm, friendly relationship that
both have worked very hard to cultivate, obviously for
self-interested reasons. Netanyahu needs Putin as leverage against
Washington to continue to ensure that the Americans not only remain
loyal to Israel, but that they increase their backing as a means of
undermining Putin. For his part, Putin needs Netanyahu and the
Israelis both as a political chess piece against Washington, and
because of the significant cultural ties between Russia and Israel,
in the form of Russian-Jewish emigres who account for a significant
proportion of Israel’s population.
Russia
needs to maintain a good relationship with Israel to placate not only
internal forces inside Russia, but also to maintain influence in
Israeli politics.
It’s
also critical to note that — while Russia has intervened in Syria
and has generally been seen as more pro-Iranian, pro-Shiite than its
western counterparts — the Kremlin still eyes the Shia warily, and
views Iran as part friend and part enemy.
As
Khaled Yacoub Oweis of the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs told Deutsche Welle earlier this year, “Russia
supposedly gave the green light when Israel attacked pro-Iranian
military targets. In one way or another, Putin has warned the
Iranians about tangling with Israel.” Such is the balancing act
Putin maintains in the Middle East where, despite Russia’s
involvement in Syria, Moscow remains close to Israel and, at least
tangentially, the United States.
And of
course, there are also economic factors at play in the Israel-Russia
calculus. Russia’s only two significant exports remain energy and
military hardware, both of which factor into Israel’s position.
Being
leaders in military technology and innovation, the Israelis see
partnership with the Russians as a lucrative investment. Similarly,
the Russians want Israeli know-how on surveillance and security,
counter-terrorism, drone technology, app development, and much more.
The Russians don’t see any such potential with any of their Arab
partners.
As for
energy, the Russians are keenly aware that the Israelis want to
exploit Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves (i.e., Leviathan field),
which could potentially make them into exporters to Europe. This
would significantly weaken Russia’s position at a time when Europe
is looking for ways to diversify away from reliance on Russian gas.
This complicates the relationship further. Needless to say, a
cost-benefit analysis for Russia is likely the outcome, and if I were
a betting man I’d say that Moscow, on balance, sees little benefit
from direct support for Palestinians.
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